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I othing complicates the life of an
economist quite like institutional change.
When institutions change, patterns of be-
havior change, and long-standing eco-
nomic relationships may break down. It
often takes time for new behavioral pat-
terns to stabilize and hence for new rela-
tionships to emerge. This lag frustrates the
economist, who often must rely on histor-
ical relationships as a basis for analysis.
A key historical relationship has been
the one between money and economic
activity. Regulatory change in the finan-
cial industry in the 1980s was expected
to affect this relationship. Many ana-
lysts believed that deregulation would
enable depository institutions to pay
higher yields on deposits and thereby
claim a larger share of the household
portfolio. This would in turn affect the
relationship between money measures
—comprised largely of deposits—and
the level of economic activity.
More recently, other changes in the finan-
cial industry have made it difficult to in-
terpret the behavior of the money supply.
Over the past year, money growth has
been unusually weak, raising concerns
about the implications for the economy.
While part of the weakness in money
growth reflects a slowdown in economic
activity, some of it can probably be attrib-
uted to financial factors.
This Economic Commentary examines
the behavior of bank deposit yields in
the period after deregulation and dis-
cusses some implications for deposit
variability and for the interpretation of
money growth. Though the relation-
ship between money and the economy
appears to have the same general form
as it did before deregulation, it has be-
come less reliable for interpreting short-
run movements of money.
• Demand for Deposits
and Opportunity Cost
An important determinant of the level of
balances held in any given deposit is the
forgone interest, or opportunity cost, of
not holding the balances in nondeposit
(that is, higher-yielding) financial instru-
ments. The opportunity cost of a given
deposit typically is measured by the dif-
ference between the market interest rate
on a relatively risk-free, short-term asset
(such as the three-month Treasury bill)
and the rate paid on that deposit (its
own rate ).
From 1933 until the financial deregula-
tion of the 1980s, virtually all consumer
deposit rates were subject to some kind
of ceiling or other restriction. Most sig-
nificantly, checking accounts were pro-
hibited from paying interest. Although
banks found ways to alter the yields on
deposits by offering gifts and providing
free services for deposits, the restrictions
were quite effective during periods of
high and rising interest rates. At these
times, banks could not respond competi-
tively, and deposit flows were largely
determined by rates paid on nondeposit
instruments.
In the early 1980s, Congress author-
ized significant changes in U.S. bank-
ing regulations, giving banks and
thrifts increased competitive powers
and eliminating interest-rate restric-
tions on deposits. Has the relationship
between money measures and the level
of economic activity changed as a
result of this financial deregulation?
The advent of deregulation raised ques-
tions about how deposit flows might be
affected if banks were allowed to be
more competitive in attracting funds.
Such flows depend on how rapidly
banks adjust their deposit rates in
response to changing market rates.
For example, consider the case where
deposit rates respond sluggishly to
changes in market rates. A permanent
increase in market interest rates would
initially be associated with an increase
in opportunity cost as market rates
moved above deposit rates, followed
by a decrease as deposit rates caught
up. The demand for deposits would ini-
tially be reduced as the opportunity
cost increased. If the deposit rates ulti-
mately adjusted point-for-point, the
opportunity cost of the deposits would
be unaffected in the long run, as would
the demand for deposits.
If, on the other hand, deposit rates ad-
just quickly but only partially to a
change in interest rates (that is, not
point-for-point), then the opportunity
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portionally with movements in interest
rates. Opportunity cost would be af-
fected by changing interest rates, but
less so than if banks were prohibited
from responding to market conditions.
Finally, consider the extreme case in
which deposit rates respond instanta-
neously to changes in market rates, so
that a constant spread is maintained be-
tween them. In such a case, the oppor-
tunity cost of deposits would not change
at all, and the demand for deposits
would be largely unaffected by changes
in market interest rates.
Because eliminating restrictions on
deposit rates would enable depository in-
stitutions to respond more freely to
market conditions, it was thought that
deregulation would lead to less variation
in opportunity costs, particularly during
periods of high and rising interest rates.
• Deposit Rates That Adjust
Somewhat Quickly
The historical pattern of the interest rate
paid on six-month time deposits illus-
trates how deregulation has affected
the pricing of most small time deposits.
Figure 1 shows that prior to deregula-
tion, interest-rate ceilings were effec-
tive during several periods when yields
on market instruments exceeded deposit
ceiling rates. These times are denoted
by the plateaus evident from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1970s.
During these periods, banks and thrifts
suffered great withdrawals of funds.
Depositors who held sufficient balances
were purchasing instruments such as U.S.
Treasury bills that were paying higher, un-
regulated yields. By 1973, money market
mutual funds (MMMFs) began to appear.
MMMFs acquired money market instru-
ments and thereby allowed small inves-
tors to invest indirectly in market-yielding
instruments. These funds involved little
risk, often required only $500 or less to
open, and were reasonably liquid.
MMMFs grew rapidly in the mid- and
late 1970s at the expense of regulated
deposit instruments.
Since deregulation, however, banks and
thrifts have responded by pricing small
time deposits competitively, adjusting
them relatively rapidly in response to
money market conditions (measured as
the Treasury bill rate). Given the substi-
tutability between six-month time depos-
its and Treasury bills, it is not surprising
that depositories have adopted such a
pricing strategy. Nevertheless, adjust-
ment of the deposit rates has not been
point-for-point and the opportunity cost
has varied, albeit less than before deregu-
lation. Thus, the demand for time depos-
its is still affected by changes in the level
of interest rates.
• Rates Paid on Checkable Deposits
Of the post-deregulation experience, the
evolution of pricing strategies for check-
able deposit rates was probably the most
difficult to anticipate. Deregulation of
such deposits was incremental. Nego-
tiable orders of withdrawal (NOWs)
were first allowed to appear at thrifts in
New England in the early 1970s. Prior
to the introduction of NOWs, house-
holds had no payment instrument that
offered an explicit yield.
To circumvent the prohibition of inter-
est payments on demand deposits,
banks introduced automatic-transfer
savings accounts in 1978, allowing (if
only indirectly) interest earnings on
checkable balances. In the early 1980s,
Congress authorized NOW accounts
nationwide for all depositories, al-
though such accounts were subject to
interest-rate ceilings roughly equal to
those for passbook savings.
After NOW accounts came super-
NOWs, which were permitted to pay
market rates with initial minimum-
balance restrictions of $10,000. Figure
2 illustrates the rates paid on super-
NOWs and NOWs. In 1986, all deposit
restrictions were removed, thus elimi-
nating the distinction between NOWs
and super-NOWs. This meant that rates
paid on personal checkable deposits
could move with the market.
Perhaps surprising to some analysts,
rates paid on checkable deposits have
not been noticeably affected by the rise
in the general level of interest rates
since deregulation. Consequently, the
opportunity cost of checkable deposits
increased substantially in 1988, and
while falling somewhat in 1989 and
1990, remained relatively high.
The sluggishness of checkable deposit
rates may reflect a number of different
factors. First, when a bank changes the
interest it pays on checkable deposits, all
balances are immediately affected. This
means that the average cost of the change
to the bank is equal to the marginal cost.
For time deposits, on the other hand,
changes in the interest rates paid affect
only new balances, so the average cost
of these funds is less affected by the
change than the marginal cost. Conse-
quently, among retail deposits, there is a
greater incentive for depositories to be
more aggressive when pricing time
rather than checkable deposits.
Another factor affecting the pricing strat-
egy of checkable deposits is the implicit
yield of the payment service—the ratio
of the value of payment services to aver-
age balances held. Processing checks is
costly. While some depositories charge
per item processed, most account holders
pay by earning less interest on their bal-
ances than they would on a nontransac-
tions instrument. When interest rates
change, the value of the payment service
is unaffected, while the level of balances
fluctuates. Thus, the implicit yield typi-
cally changes with interest rates. Because
average balances generally fall in re-
sponse to rising market rates, the implicit
yield increases. Conversely, average bal-
ances tend to rise as market rates fall,
causing the implicit yield to decrease. In
principle, one might expect that the value
of the services rendered would equal the
forgone interest.
• Rates Paid on MMDAs
In 1983, banks and thrifts were per-
mitted to offer money market deposit
accounts (MMDAs). These deposits
had limited checking privileges but
were not subject to interest-rate ceil-
ings. Their characteristics made them
relatively close substitutes for MMMFs;
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yields would be responsive to changes
in money market rates.
While MMDA rates do move with
other market rates (see figure 3), the
response is somewhat less rapid and
complete than the response of small
time deposit rates. This probably
reflects the fact that rate changes apply
to all MMDA balances. Thus, the
average cost of a change in MMDA
rates equals the marginal cost.
The pricing patterns evidenced since
MMDAs were introduced suggest that ad-
justments to market conditions appear to
be asymmetric. Depositories appear to re-
spond more completely when market
rates are falling than when rates are rising.
• The Opportunity Cost of Money
As noted above, many analysts believed
that deregulation would allow deposi-
tories to compete more readily for funds
by paying interest rates that were more
sensitive to market conditions. More-
over, it was thought that depositories,
which were given expanded powers,
would have more profit opportunities,
allowing them to pay more for deposits.
One might expect that the opportunity
cost of deposits would be lower on
average and would vary less than before
deregulation.
M2—currently the most widely used
measure of the money supply—largely
comprises deposits at banks and thrifts.
Its opportunity cost is commonly meas-
ured as the difference betweenthe Treas-
ury bill rate and the share-weighted
average of rates paid on deposits in-
cluded in M2. Although the opportunity
cost of M2 has recently been lower and
less variable than historical standards, the
effect of deregulation does not appear
substantial. The opportunity cost of M2
is lower (see figure 4) largely because
market interest rates have been lower.
• Opportunity Cost and M2 Velocity
To the extent that deregulation may have
lowered the opportunity cost of M2 rela-
tive to the general level of interest rates,
one might expect that deregulation has
affected the relationship between M2
and economic activity. One simple
measure of this relationship is the
velocity of M2—the ratio of nominal
gross national product (GNP) to M2.
Figure 4 shows that, historically, M2
velocity has varied directly with its
opportunity cost. When opportunity
cost has risen, M2 velocity has also in-
creased. Conversely, when the oppor-
tunity cost of M2 has been low, house-
holds have tended to hold a greater
share of their assets as M2 components,
and the ratio of spending to M2 deposits
has fallen. This suggests that increased
holdings of M2 are sometimes a port-
folio choice that is unrelated to current
and future levels of spending.
Many analysts expected M2 oppor-
tunity cost to be lower after deregula-
tion, and thus expected the average
level of M2 velocity to be lower. In-
deed, by the early 1980s, M2 velocity
had dropped to new lows, even beyond
what the historical relationship with its
opportunity cost would suggest. Some
analysts argued then that the long-term
average of M2 velocity had shifted
downward. The implication is that the
rapid money growth experienced dur-
ing that period was associated with
portfolio decisions of households and
was not indicative of a surge in future
spending. With hindsight, it is clear
that the buildup in M2 balances in the
mid-1980s was not associated with a
subsequent surge in spending.
Curiously, since early 1988, M2 velocity
has increased while its opportunity cost
has fallen, bringing M2 velocity back to
its long-term average value and suggest-
ing that the long-term average velocity
has not shifted downward. What is puz-
zling is why the relationship between M2
velocity and its opportunity cost has
changed. While it is clear how the rela-tionship between deposit rates and other
interest rates might be affected by dereg-
ulation, it is not obvious why the link
between opportunity cost and velocity
would be affected.
Preliminary investigations suggest that
the aggregate measure of M2 oppor-
tunity cost may not be accurate: It may
not capture the "effective" cost of hold-
ing deposits. For example, time deposits
involve a commitment of funds, possi-
bly for several years. The relevant alter-
native interest rate for these deposits is
more appropriately that of a U.S. Treas-
ury note (security with maturities of one
to seven years) rather than a three-month
bill (used above). Ideally, one would
want to estimate a disaggregated model
where each alternative rate would cor-
respond in maturity to that of the deposit
rate. Unfortunately, data limitations do
not allow the level of disaggregation that
would be necessary to measure oppor-
tunity cost appropriately.
Another problem is that the deposit
rates used in the opportunity cost cal-
culation are based on the single most
common rate paid. Some depositories
have at times offered rates substantially
above their most common rate. Hence,
the most common rate is not relevant
for calculating the opportunity cost of
such deposits.
Finally, some analysts have argued that
the breakdown in the relationship be-
tween velocity and opportunity cost
may be related to the restructuring of
the thrift industry. While the economic
foundations for this hypothesis are not
evident, preliminary analysis suggests
that changes in the thrift industries'
share of the economy's total deposit
base help to explain the unusual be-
havior of velocity.
• Conclusion
Recent evidence indicates that the
relationships among M2, opportunity
cost, and nominal GNP have changed.
How these relationships have been af-
fected by deregulation and by other
changes in the financial industry is not
completely understood, nor is it known
whether effects have stabilized so that
reliable relationships have emerged.
This raises uncertainties about the inter-
pretation of M2 growth in the short run.
If thrift restructuring is a factor in the
recent weakness of M2, the effect on
velocity is likely to continue, and money
growth will be weaker than usual rela-
tive to economic activity. Thus, recovery
from the recent economic downturn
will not necessarily be accompanied by
a sharp rise in M2 growth.
Without an economic basis for explain-
ing the recent patterns of M2 velocity,
there is no compelling reason for con-
cluding that the long-term average
value of velocity has changed. On the
one hand, the opportunity cost of M2
seems low for the prevailing level of in-
terest rates, suggesting that velocity
should be lower than its trend. At the
same time, velocity appears to be
higher than usual relative to the prevail-
ing opportunity cost. The net effect is
that these two disturbances largely off-
set one another right now.
• Footnotes
1. MMDAs allow three debits per month.
2. M2 comprises currency in the hands of
the nonbank public, checkable deposits,
money market deposit accounts, small time
deposits, money market mutual funds
(general purpose), and overnight repurchase
agreements. Deposits account for about 80
percent of M2.
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